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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 15-4107 
_____________ 
 
 
DOUGLAS G. KUNKLE, 
 
      Appellant. 
 
v. 
 
ANDREA NAUGLE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CLERK OF JUDICIAL RECORDS 
FOR THE COUNTY OF LEHIGH (AKA CLERK OF COURTS OR 
PROTHONOTARY); THE COUNTY OF LEHIGH; WILLIAM BERNDT, 
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS COURT ADMINISTRATOR FOR LEHIGH COUNTY; 
CAROL K. MCGINLEY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PRESIDENT JUDGE FOR THE 
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEHIGH COUNTY 
      
_____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No.:  5-15-cv-00896) 
District Judge:  Honorable Edward G. Smith 
_____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on July 12, 2016 
 
 
(Filed: August 19, 2016) 
 
 
Before:  SMITH, JORDAN and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
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____________ 
 
O P I N I O N* 
____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge, 
 Pro Se Appellant Douglas G. Kunkle, Esq. appeals the District Court’s order 
dismissing his claim pursuant to Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  Kunkle raised a 
variety of claims against Defendants after they denied his application to participate in an 
electronic court filing (“e-filing”) pilot program sponsored by the Court of Common 
Pleas of Lehigh County.  The District Court dismissed the complaint on immunity and 
Article III standing grounds.  For the reasons stated below, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order.  
I. Factual Background 
 This lawsuit arose from Kunkle’s rejection from an e-filing pilot program 
sponsored by the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County.  The pilot program allowed 
those accepted to electronically file civil legal documents before e-filing was available to 
the public in order to ensure the adequacy of the IT platform.  Defendant President Judge 
McGinley, with assistance from Defendant Court Administrator Berndt and Defendant 
Prothonotary Naugle, announced the program in 2013.  Judge McGinley stated that she 
would open the pilot program to select lawyers and firms, and that she would review 
applications and notify those accepted.  After Kunkle applied for the pilot program, 
                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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Defendant Berndt, as Court Administrator and on behalf of Judge McGinley, informed 
Kunkle that he had not been selected.  Berndt stated that, although not all applicants were 
accepted, “hopefully the pilot will be successful so that it can be expanded quickly to all 
those filing civil actions.” (App. Vol. II at 62).   
 Kunkle was quite vocal in airing his grievances regarding this rejection.  At a 
Lehigh County commissioner meeting, Kunkle complained that “it just seems to me to be 
a very affront to equal protection of the law that one attorney can use the electronic filing 
system 24/7 while the other attorney has to hand file his.”  (App. Vol. II at 20).  At the 
meeting, Defendant Berndt clarified that only a pilot program was currently in place.  He 
spoke on behalf of President Judge McGinley, emphasizing that she worked meticulously 
on the IT platform and wanted to ensure that e-filing worked well before she opened it to 
the public.  Kunkle also sent several emails to county officials demanding money 
damages for being rejected. 
 Kunkle later filed a complaint against four defendants—Judge McGinley, Andrea 
Naugle, and William Berndt individually and in their official capacities, and the County 
of Lehigh—and later an amended complaint in which he stated the following claims:  
Deprivation of Equal Privileges and Immunities to Court Access, First Amendment 
Retaliation and Deprivation of Right to Petition, Conspiracy to Deprive Equal Privileges 
and Immunities to Court Access (all under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985); Dissolution of 
Home Rule Charter as Unduly Vague Pursuant to the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
of the United States Constitution; and violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(“ADA”).  Kunkle requested monetary damages in the amount of $1,000 for every day he 
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could not access the pilot program (638 days, by his calculation) and $150,000 for his 
First Amendment claim.  Kunkle was granted full access to the e-filing system on March 
16, 2015 when it was published on the Unified Judicial System Web Application Portal. 
 Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the claim for failure to state a claim for 
which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6).  The District Court 
granted the motion as to counts one and three on Eleventh Amendment immunity 
grounds, and for count two on the grounds that Kunkle failed to legally support the claim.  
It dismissed count four because Kunkle lacked Article III standing.  
 As the District Court noted, Kunkle’s complaint was unclear, making the precise 
nature of the claims difficult to discern.  The District Court addressed the claims as 
follows: claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1985, and the Dissolution claim.  The ADA 
claim was not appealed.  We take guidance from the District Court and frame our 
discussion of Kunkle’s claims in a similar manner. 
II. Discussion1 
a. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985 Claims 
 The District Court correctly relied upon Eleventh Amendment immunity to 
dismiss claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985 against Defendants President Judge 
                                              
 1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  This court exercises plenary review over the 
granting of a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) for failing to state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted.  See Children’s Seashore House v. Waldman, 
197 F.3d 654, 658 (3d Cir. 1999).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, . . . that allows the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.  Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).   
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McGinley, Court Administrator Berndt, and Prothonotary Naugle in their personal and 
official capacities.  First, the District Court properly dismissed the claims against the 
defendants in their official capacities because “[n]either a State nor its officials acting in 
their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”  Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 
(1991) (quoting Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)).  The same 
holds true for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.  See Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 205 
(3d Cir. 1975).   
 Second, Defendants McGinley, Berndt and Naugle, in their individual capacities, 
are protected by qualified immunity.  Qualified immunity protects “government officials 
performing discretionary functions . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their 
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.”  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  
Kunkle claims that the defendants engaged in a conspiracy to deprive him of his 
Fourteenth Amendment rights by excluding him from the e-filing pilot program.  
However, we find no reason to believe that acceptance into an e-filing pilot program is a 
clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have been aware, so the 
defendants are entitled to protection through qualified immunity.2   
                                              
 2 Further, Berndt and Naugle, as they were acting as Court Administrator and 
Prothonotary, respectively, are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.  See Gallas v. 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 773 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[C]ourt personnel 
are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for their alleged acts . . . pursuant to the 
judge’s instructions.”) (quoting Dellenbach v. Letsinger, 889 F.2d 755, 763 (7th 
Cir.1989)). 
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 Third, the County of Lehigh is not liable because the pilot program was not 
official municipal policy, which is required under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City 
of New York. 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (“[T]he language of § 1983, read against the 
background of the same legislative history, compels the conclusion that Congress did not 
intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy 
of some nature caused a constitutional tort.”); see also Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 
U.S. 469, 481-82 (1986) (“The fact that a particular official—even a policymaking 
official—has discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not, without more, 
give rise to municipal liability based on an exercise of that discretion.”).    
 For these reasons, Kunkle cannot bring these claims against Defendants 
McGinley, Berndt and Naugle in their official or individual capacities, or against the 
County of Lehigh. 
 
b. The Dissolution Claim 
 In this claim, Kunkle seeks dissolution of the County of Lehigh Home Rule 
Charter because it is unduly vague and “causes great confusion regarding the 
fundamental rights of its officers and citizenry.”  (App. Vol. II at 33).  The District Court 
properly dismissed count four by finding that Kunkle does not have Article III standing.  
As the party invoking federal jurisdiction, Kunkle bears the burden of establishing 
standing.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).    In Lujan, the 
Supreme Court held that such claims resting upon a “generalized grievance, [are] 
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inconsistent with the framework of Article III because the impact on [plaintiff] is plainly 
undifferentiated and common to all members of the public.”  504 U.S. at 575 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 171, 176-
77 (1974)).  Kunkle does not allege that the Home Rule Charter directly injured him in 
any way, and the alleged general confusion is not sufficient to establish Article III 
standing.  The District Court thus properly dismissed count four.  
III. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, the District Court properly dismissed the complaint.  
